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RAYHOND M. BERRY
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
700 Contlnental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:
521-9000

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AETNA LIFE & CASUALTY,
Plaintiff & Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 15306

UNITED PACIFIC/RELIANCE
INSURANCE COMPANIES,
Defendant & Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by Aetna Life & Casualty, liability insurer of Heublein, Inc., to recover damages from
United Pacific/Reliance, liability insurer of Regina Grape
Products, to recover amounts incurred by Aetna in settling
and defending an action against Heublein.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court denied appellant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and granted respondent's t1otion for
Summary Judgment.

RESULT SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the
lower court, including the granting of its Motion for
Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 1, 19 7 0, United Pacific/Reliance Insurance
Company (hereinafter called "United Pacific") issued to
Regina Grape Products Company (hereinafter called "Regina"!
comprehensive liability insurance policy No. CLP32221
effective from July 1, 1970, to July 1, 1973, with a
limit of $1,000,000 for personal injuries arising from
each occurrence.

On January 1, 1970, Aetna Life &

Casualty (hereinafter called "Aetna") issued to Heublein,
Inc.,

(hereinafter called "Heublein") policy No. 07

AL138288SR, effective from January 1, 1970, through
December 31, 1970.

This policy insured Heublein against

loss or injuries in any one occurrence with a limit of
$1,000,000.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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On December 31, 1970, George Shuput, an of=ice
employee of Parker-Mawood in Salt Lake City, Utah, was
injured while opening a bottle of pink champagne when
the cork shot out and struck him in the eye.

Thereaf-

ter on June 7, 1973, George Shuput instituted Civil Case
C-195-73 in the United States District Court of Utah
against Heublein, Inc., to recover damages for personal
injury arising from the December 31, 1970, accident.
The allegations in C-195-73 show Shuput's action is
against Heublein, a Connecticut corporation, not against
Regina, which was a California corporation (R6).

Nor

does the Complaint filed in C-195-73 allege that Regina,
the California corporation that United Pacific insured,
did anything (R6-9) .
On December 17, 1970, a plan and agreement of
merger was entered into between Heublein, a Connecticut
corporation, and Regina, a California corporation.

Arti-

cle I of the merger agreement provides that on the effective date of the merger Regina shall cease to exist and
shall be merged into Heublein (R87).

Regina in Article

VI, Paragraph l, subparagraph (e) represented and warranted to Heublein as of October 31, 1970, there were no
claims or debts or liabilities of Regina, fixed or contingent (R89).

Regina also, in Article VI, Paragraph

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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1(1), warranted and represented that the policies of
insurance held by Regina would be kept in force until
the effective date of the merger.
Article VIII of the conditions of the merger contains no condition requiring Regina to insure Heublein
against loss from the date of the plan and agreement of
merger, December 17, 1970, through and including the
effective date of the merger.

At the effective time of

the merger, the owners of Regina received 60,000 shares
of Heublein stock in exchange for the delivery of all
Regina stock owned by the sole shareholder John Ellena
(Rl02)
No request was made of United Pacific until
January 17, 1971, seventeen days after the accident,
to name Heublein as an additional insured under its
Policy No. CLP32221.
The merger became effective January 28, 1971,
when the Certificate of Merger was filed.
Section 16-10-71, Utah Code Annotated 1961,
provides:
16-10-71. Effect of Merger or Conso~i~a
tion.--Upon the issuance of the certlflcate of merger or the certificate of consolidation by the secretary of state, the
merger or consolidation shall be effected.
When such merger or consolidation has
been effected:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(a)

* * *

(b)

* * *

(c)

* * *

{d)

* * *

(e) Such surviving or new corporation
shall thenceforth be responsible and liable
for all the liabilities and obligations
of each of the corporations so merged or
consolidated; and any claim existing or action
or proceeding pending by or against any of
such corporations may be prosecuted as if
such merger or consolidation had not taken
place, or such surviving or new corporation
may be substituted in its place. Neither the
right[s] of creditors nor any liens upon the
property of any such corporation shall be
impaired by such merger or consolidation.
[Emphasis added]
Aetna Coverage
In Paragraph 6 of the conditions of the Aetna
policy it is provided:
6. Other Insurance. The insurance afforded
by this policy is primary insurance, except
when stated to apply in excess of or contingent
upon the absence of other insurance. When this
insurance is primary, and the insured has other
insurance which is stated to be applicable
to the loss on an excess or a contigent basis,
the amount of the company's liability under this
policy shall not be reduced by the existence
of such other insurance.
[Emphasis added]
When both this insurance and other insurance
apply to the loss on the same basis, whether
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primary, excess or contingent, the company
shall not be liable under this policy for a great ,
.
~
proportlon of the loss than that stated in the
applicable contribution provision below:
(a)

* * *

(b)
* * * Contribution by limits.
If any of such other insurance does not provide
contribution by equal shares, the company shall
not be liable for a greater proportion of such
loss than the applicable limit of liability
under this policy for such loss bears to the
total applicable limit of liability of all valid
and collectible insurance against such loss.

United Pacific Coverage
The following provisions of United Pacific's
policy are pertinent:
UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY (A Stock
Insurance Company, herein called the
company), in consideration of the payment
of the premium and subject to all the terms
of this policy, agrees with the insured
named in the declarations, hereinafter
called "named insured," as follows:
INSURING AGREEMENTS
I.
Liability. To pay on behalf of
the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay
by reason of the liability for damages
(a) imposed upon him by law or (b)
assumed by him under any contract or
agreement wholly in writing, because of:

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Bodily Injury,
Property Damage;
further, to defend any suit against
the insured in which such damages are
sought, reserving to the company the
rlght to lnvestigate, negotiate and
settle any claim or suit.
Definitions of interest are as follows:
DEFINITIONS
As Used in This Policy:
(a) "bodily injury" means bodily injury,
sickness or disease sustained by a person,
including (l) death resulting therefrom
and (2) damages for care and loss of services because of bodily injury, sickness
or disease.

* * *
(c) "occurrence" means an accident, an
event or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions causing, during the
policy period, bodily injury or property
damage neither expected nor intended by
the insured. All injury or damage arising out of exposure due to substantially
the same general condition shall be considered as arising out of one occurrence.
(d) "insured" means the named insured,
his spouse, if a resident in the same
household, and: .
"
United Pacific's policy contains the following
applicable general conditions:
GENERAL CONDITIONS
(Applicable Only As Otherwise Specified)

* * *
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5. Changes.
Notice to any agent or
knowledge possessed by any person
shall not affect or waive or change any
part of this policy or estop the company from asserting any of its right
under this policy. The terms of this
policy shall not be waived or changed,
except by an endorsement issued to
form a part of this policy signed by
the company's authorized representative.
6. Notice.
In the event of an accident, occurrence or loss, written notice
containing particulars sufficient to
identify the insured and also reasonably obtainable information with respect
to the time, place and circumstances
thereof, and the names and addresses
of the injured and of available witnesses, shall be given by or for the
insured to the company or any of its authorized agents as· soon as practicable.
In the event of theft the insured shall
also promptly notify the police.
If
claim is made or suit is brought against
the insured, he shall immediately forward
to the company every demand, notice, summons or other process received by him or
his representative. (Emphasis added]

* * *
12. Action Against Company. As a condition precedent to action against the
company, the insured shall have fully
complied with all the terms of this
policy and the amount of his obligation
shall have been finally determined either
by judgment after actual trial or by written agreement between the insured, the
claimant and the company. Judgment shall
not be deemed final until the suit shall
have been finally determined on any appeal.
prosecuted therefrom. Any ~erson or organlzation or legal representatlve thereof,
having secured such judgment or written
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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agreement, shall be entitled to recover under this policy to the extent
of the insurance afforded hereby. ~o
person or organization shall have any
r1ght under this policy to join the
company as a party to any action against
the 1nsured to determine the insured's
liability, nor shall the company be
lmpleaded by the insured or by his legal
representative.
Bankruptcy or insolvency
of the insured or his estate shall not
relieve the company of any of its obligation.
In addition to the general conditions, Nos. 4
and 5 under Conditions read as follows:
CONDITIONS

* * *
4.
Assignment. No assignment of interest under this policy shall bind the
company until its consent is endorsed
hereon.
If, however, the named insured
shall die, this policy shall cover (a)
the named insured's legal representative as named insured, and (b) subject
to the definition of insured above, any
person having proper temporary custody
of an owned or hired automobile, as an
insured, until the appointment and
qualification of such legal representative; provided that notice of cancellation addressed to the insured named in
the declarations and mailed to the address
shown in this policy shall be sufficient
notice to effect cancellation of this
policy.
5.
Other Insurance.
If at the time
of an occurrence any valid and collectible insurance is available to the
insured (in this or any other carrier),
except insurance purchased to apply in
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excess of the limit of liabilitv of this
policy, no insurance shall be afforded
hereunder as respects such occurrence;
except, if this policy exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other
insurance, this policy shall afford
excess insurance over such other insurance sufficient to afford the insured a
combined limit of liability equal to the
limit of liability of this policy.
Insurance under this policy shall not be
construed to be concurrent or contributing with any other insurance whatsoever.
[Emphasis added]
Endorsement 1 of United Pacific's policy shows
the named insureds at the time of issuance of the
policy, July 1, 1970.

Endorsement No. 19 of the United

Pacific policy effective January 17, 1971, picks up
Heublein as an insured.
In Civil Case C-195-73 filed June 7, 1973,
Shuput did not name Regina as an insured.
was named as a defendant.

Only Heublein

No suit or claim has ever

been instituted by Shuput against Regina.
UTAH INSURANCE STATUTES
Section 31-19-18 provides:
Contract of Insurance--Variations of terms
of policy invalid.--No insurer or its agent,
nor any solicitor or broker shall make any
contract of insurance or agreement as to
such contract, other than is plainly
expressed in the policy issued thereon.
Any such understanding.or a~reement not
so expressed shall be lnvalld.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT I:

United Pacific Did No~

Insure Heublein on December 31, 1970.
It is stipulated between the parties that it
was not until January 17, 1971, that United Pacific
was asked to name Heublein as an initial insured under
its Policy No. CLP32221 (Rl30).
As a condition to the merger, Heublein in the
plan and agreement of merger could have required that
Regina from the date of the plan and agreement of merger,
December 17, 1970, provide liability insurance for
Heublein.

Heublein did not require that it be named

an insured from this date on Regina's policy, probably
because it knew it was afforded coverage by Aetna.

The

requirement in the plan and agreement of merger was for
Regina to keep in force a policy protecting Regina.
This was done.
because

The purpose of this requirement was

the merger of the corporations does not termi-

nate the liability of Regina.
In Thomas v. Ogden Rapid Transit Company, 47 U.
595, 155 Pac. 436

(1960), Thomas, a passenger on the

Ogden City Transit, brought suit against it for an injury
arising from a collision.

Prior to the trial, Ogden

City Transit was consolidated into a new corporation
under the name of Ogden, Logan & Idaho Railroad Company.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
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The defendant at trial moved for a substitution of
party defendant, claiming that the consolidation abated
the action against Ogden Rapid Transit Company.

In

denying the motion, the court said:

* * * It is urged that by the consolidation all pending actions by or
against the defendant abated.
To support this, 10 Cyc. p. 310, is cited.
But on the next page a contrary doctrine also is stated. We need not
consider which of these views is the
better, for, as we think, the statute
(Comp. Laws 1907, §§ 340, 341), permitting consolidations of such corporations, provides that the constituent
corporations are not relieved from
their respective debts and liabilities,
though the consolidated corporation is
made responsible for the debts and liabilities of both. While it may be conceded that the plaintiff, by proper
amendments and allegations, might have
proceeded also against the consolidated
corporation, or against it alone, yet
it did not rest with the defendant,
because of the consolidation, to seek
a discharge of its liabilities or an
abatement or dismissal of the action,
or to compel the plaintiff to proceed
against the consolidated corporation
alone. * * *
Aetna's argument that Heublein is Regina wearing a new dress is not true and is not correct.
argument is not logical.

This

At the time the suit was

instituted by Shuput against Heublein in 1973, Heublein
was Regina, but Regina, the United Pacific insured, was
not Heublein.
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The purpose in requiring Regina to continue its
insurance in force was to protect Regina from liability
until the merger was completed.
person two choices.

Merger gives an injured

The injured can either sue the pre-

decessor corporation or the successor.
If Shuput had sued Regina, United Pacific would
have been required under the terms of its policy to
defend Regina.

However, as Shuput sued only the suc-

cessor Heublein, and Heublein was not an insured, United
Pacific owed no duty to defend Heublein and owes no duty
to indemnify Aetna against the loss for which it had
been paid a premium to cover.
If it were true that the action against Regina
abated upon merger, there would be logic in the argument that Heublein is Regina, but as this is not true,
there is no reason why United Pacific should be required
to indemnify Aetna.
In some states, claims and even pending claims
for personal injuries abate upon dissolution of a corporation.

Hawley v. Bonanza Queen Mining Company, 61

wash. 90, 111 Pac. 1073 (1910).

This is a carry-over

rule, probably arising from the idea that personal
injury claims at common law abated upon the death of
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the tort feasor.

To escape this hardship, many states

enacted laws to make the successor corporation liable
for the liabilities, debts and obligations of a predecessor corporation in the event of merger and dissolution of the predecessor.

Still other states, as

Connecticut, the domicile of Heublein, and Utah,
retain the cause of action against the predecessor corporation and also make the successor corporation liable.
This modern rule, as in Connecticut and Utah, gives the
injured person the greatest protection.
Section 33-369(e) of the General Statutes of
Connecticut is similar to Section l6-l0-7l(e), Utah
Code Annotated.

It reads:

The Surviving or New corporation shall
henceforth be responsible and liable
for all the liabilities, obligations
and penalties, including liability to
descending shareholders, of each of
the merging or consolidating corporations; and any claim existing or action
or proceeding, civil or criminal, pending by or against any such corporatlon
may be prosecuted as if such merger or
consolidation had not taken place, or
such surviving or new corporation may
be substituted in its place; and any
judgment rendered against any of ~he
merging or consolidating corpora~lons
may be enforced against the survlVlng
or new corporation. * * * [Emphasis added]
Under the existing law, Shuput, the plaintiff,
had an equal right to sue Regina or Heublein.

United
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Pacific got the premium for insuring Regina.

If Regina

had been sued alone, it would have been the duty of United
Pacific to defend Regina without assistance from Heublein's
insurer Aetna.

If both Regina and Heublein had been sued,

Aetna and United Pacific each would have had a duty to
defend.

On the other hand, as only Heublein •..:as sued and

as only Heublein was an insured of Aetna on December 31,
1970, it was the entire responsibility of Aetna to defend
Heublein.
POINT II:

There is No Duty to Defend or Settle When

Claim Does Not Fall Within Coverage of Policy.
Plaintiff instituted C-195-73 in the United
states District Court for the District of Utah against
Heublein, a Connecticut corporation.

There is no alle-

gation in C-195-73 against Regina, the California corporation insured by United Pacific.

In fact, there is

no allegation in the Complaint in C-195-73 that Regina
designed, manufactured, distributed or did anything.
Regina, by name, was not mentioned in the Complaint
in C-195-73.
The general rule is that if the allegations in
the complaint against an insured fail to show that a
claim is within the coverage, there is no duty to defend.
In McAlear v. St. Paul Insurance Companies, 158
Mont. 452, 493 P.2d 331 (1972), the Montana Supreme
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Court held that where the complaint against an insured
is clearly not within coverage of professional liability policy, the insurer would not have been obliged
to indemnify if complainant recovered and that the
insurer had no duty to defend action.
In a later case, Atcheson v. Safeco Insurance
Company, 165 Mont. 239, 527 P.2d 549 (1974), the
Montana Court again held that the liability insurer's
duty to defend is determined by the allegations of the
complaint filed against the insured.
In 44 AmJur 2d Insurance

§

1539, the general

rule is stated:
Upon the basis of the allegations of
the complaint or petition, the courts
have adopted the following tests for
determing whether particular allegations require the insurer to defend
the action brought against the insured:
if the complaint in the action brought
against the insured upon its face
alleges facts which come within the
coverage of the liability policy, the
insurer is obligated to assume the
defense of the action; but if the
alleged facts fail to bring the case
within the policy coverage, the insurer
is free of such obligation, at least
initially.
Stated differently, the
insurer is under an obligation to
defend only if it could be held bound
to indemnify the insured, assuming
that the injured person proved the
allegations of the complaint, regardless of the actual outcome of the
case. * * *
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company, 12 Ariz. App. 424, 471 P.2d
309

(1970), the complaint alleged that Vann was using

the vehicle with the permission of the named insured
and that this alone created an obligation to defend
vann even though Vann was not in fact a person to whom
the insured owed any duty whatsoever under any contractual undertaking.

The policy excluded coverage unless

vann was a permissive user.

The Arizona

Cour~

held

that the policy provision providing that a defense be
afforded against suits that are groundless, false or
fraudulent did not under these circumstances require
the insurance company to defend Vann, a complete stranger to the contract, and that no obligation to defend
or pay existed and that none could be created by the
drafter of the complaint.
In McCarty v. Parks v. Royal Globe Insurance
companies, 565 P.2d 1122, Utah 1977, this Court held
that the automobile liability insurer's covenant to
defend actions against automobile repair shop and its
owners, as named insureds, ran only to such insureds
and did not benefit non-permissive users; hence,
although insurer may have taken some risk in refusing
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to defend suit against user, who in garnishment proceedings was found to have been using the vehicle without owner's permission, insurer could not be held liable for refusing to defend personal injury suit or
required to pay judgment rendered against user.
In Civil Case C-195-73 Shuput made no allegations against Regina.

No request was made of United

Pacific to add Heublein as an insured on the Regina
policy until January 17, 1971, seventeen days after
the alleged injury to Shuput.
If there is no duty to defend a non-permissive
user, there is no duty to defend a company (Heublein)
that is not an insured and certainly no duty to indemnify Aetna the liability insurer of Heublein, Shuput
could have proven every fact alleged in the Complaint
in C-195-73 and still would not have been entitled to
recover from United Pacific through a garnishment proceeding.
POINT III:

In Any Event, the United Pacific

Policy Provides Excess Coverage Only.
United Pacific denies that its policy affords
any coverage to Heublein.

However, for the sake of

discussion, let's assume that the United Pacific policy
affords coverage.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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United Pacific's policy provides that any coverage under it is in excess of other insurance coverage.
United Pacific's "Other Insurance" clause reads
as follows:
5.
Other Insurance.
If at the time
of an occurrence any valid and collectlble insurance is available to the
insured (in this or any other carrier),
except insurance purchased to apply in
excess of the limit of liabilitv of
this policy, no insurance shall be
afforded hereunder as respects such
occurrence; except, if the applicable
limit of liability of this policy
exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other insurance, this
policy shall afford excess insurance
over such other insurance sufficient
to aford the insured a combined limit
of liability equal to the limit of
liability of this policy.
Insurance
under this policy shall not be construed to be concurrent or contributing with any other insurance whatsoever.
[Emphasis added]
On the other hand, the Aetna policy provides
that it is primary.

In Paragraph 6 of the Conditions

of the Aetna policy, it is stated:
6. Other Insurance. The insurance
afforded by the policy is primary
insurance, except when stated to
apply in excess of or contingent
upon the absence of other insurance.
When this insurance is primary, and
the insured has other insurance which
is stated to be applicable to the
loss on an excess or contingent basis,
the amount of the company's liability
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under this policy shall not be reduced
by the existence of such other insurance.
In Russell v. Paulsen, 18 Utah 2d 157, 470 P.2d
658

(1966), a case before this Court involving unin-

sured motorist coverage, this Court enforced an excess
other-insurance clause.

In Russell the driver's insur-

ance company, United Pacific, settled with the passenger
for the sum of $4,500.00, and at the time of the settlement, the financial responsibility law required only
$5,000.00 of uninsured motorist coverage for injuries
to any one person.

Thereafter, recognizing the excess

clause, the Court found that the plaintiff could not
recover from her own uninsured motorist carrier, as her
policy was excess over the primary policy of United
Pacific, and that as United Pacific's policy had not
been exhausted, she was barred from recovery.
The liability of an insurer on a policy with an
excess clause does not arise until the limits of all
other valid and collectible insurance are exhausted.
In Mt. States Mutual Casualty Co. v. American Casualty
co., 135 Mont. 475, 342 P.2d 748

(1959), an action was

brought by an automobile liability insurer under a nonownership policy providing excess coverage against a
garage liability insurer to recover amounts paid in
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settlement of claims.

Mt. States named ~cBee Truck

Sales as its insured.

McBee loaned a truck to Highla~ds

Golf Club.

Peck, an employee of Highlands, while using

the truck was involved in an accident.

Highlands had

a policy in which the other-insurance clause was excess,
not pro-rata coverage.

Theother-L~surance

Mt. States policy was on a pro-rata basis.

clause in the
In finding

in favor of American and against Mt. States, the
Montana Court said that the American policy of excess
coverage was not regarded as other valid and collectible insurance, as it was not available until the Mt.
States policy was exhausted.
Aetna has advocated that the excess clause prevails.

In Viani v. Aetna Insurance Co., 95 Idaho 22,

501 P.2d 706

(1972), the case arose from a gunshot

wound due to the negligence of Bowles.
Viani had been on a trip together.

Bowles and

On returning home,

Viani tossed from his truck Bowles' bed roll containing, unknown to Viani, a loaded pistol.
discharged, injuring Viani.

The pistol

Bowles had a homeowner's

policy issued by Aetna with a limit of $50,000 coverage and a comprehensive general automobile liability
policy issued by American with a limit of $100,000
coverage.

Viani had an Allstate Crusader policy on
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his truck with a limit of $10,000.

The jury awarded

Viani $14,622.00.
The agent of Bowles gave no notice to American
of the accident, and no demand was made upon American
to defend the suit.

American was let out of the law-

suit because of failure to comply with notice.

However,

the court found that the Allstate policy, with respect
to the owned vehicle, provided primary coverage and
that the Aetna policy, with respect to the non-owned
vehicle, provided excess coverage.

The court found

that as to the named insured Viani, the vehicle was
an owned vehicle and that as to Aetna it was a nonowned vehicle and that as Bowles was not the owner,
the Allstate policy was primary and the Aetna policy
was excess.
In Insurance Law & Practice, 8 Appleman 4914,
Appleman states the rule:

* * *

In such case, the liability of
the excess insurer does not arise until
the limits of the collectible insurance
under the primary policy have been
exceeded.
It should be noted that
under thisrule, the courts give no
application to the other ~nsuran~e
clause in the primary pol1cy, wh1ch
provides that if the additi?nal insured
has other valid and collect1ble lnsurance,he shall not be covered by the
primary policy. That is because the
.
insurance under the excess coverage pol1cy
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is not regarded as other collectible
Lnsurance, as it is not available to
the Lnsured until the ?ri~ary insurance polLcy has been exhausted. * * *
In this case, in defending Aetna has recognized
that its policy affords valid and collectible insurance.
Its limit was $1,000,000, and in making the settlement
with Shuput for Heublein the limit was not exhausted.
Globe Indemnity Company and Roval IndemnLtv
Company v. Western Casualty & Surety Comoanv, 523 P.2d
858, Utah 1974, is another Utah case upholding an excess,
other-insurance clause.

In Globe Indemnitv, Iverson,

the owner of a Chevrolet pickup truck, took it to
Gordon Wilson for repairs and borrowed a passenger
automobile to use while repairs were being undertaken.
Iverson gave permission to his daughter to use the
loaned vehicle, and she in turn allowed her boyfriend
Carl Lundeberg to drive the vehicle, and an accident
occurred while Carl Lundeberg was driving the loaned
vehicle home from a show.

Western Casualty had a policy

that afforded coverage on the residence of the Lundeberg
household.

Globe Indemnity had a policy in effect

covering Iverson, and Royal Indemnity had a garage
liability policy in effect covering Gordon Wilson
Chevrolet Company.

Western undertook the defense of
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the action and settled.

Globe and Royal initiated pro-

ceedings to have it determined who should indemnify
against the loss.

Royal's policy provided that its

policy shall be excess insurance over any other valid
and collectible insurance.

The Globe policy also pro-

vided that it was excess and that coverage would be
afforded if there was no other valid and collectible
insurance.

This Court, following Russell, held the

primary liability for indemnity was on Western.
Consistency is important.

This Court should

follow the general rule, including its decisions in
Russell and Globe Indemnity, and hold no coverage is
afforded under the United Pacific policy to Heublein
because the primary limit of the Aetna policy was not
exhausted in the settlement with Shuput.
POINT IV:

As Heublein Has Not Incurred a Loss,

United Pacific Is Not Obligated to Indemnify Heublein.
Heublein incurred no costs and expenses arising
from the Shuput claim.

Aetna, not Heublein, paid the

loss and settled the claim of Shuput.
Even assuming, which United Pacific denies, that
its policy insures Heublein, Heublein has no loss, and
2\etna can take nothing by way of an assignment of
Heublein's interest.
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In New Hampshire Insurance Company v. Ballard
Nade,

Inc., etc., 17 Utah 2d 86, 404 P.2d 674

a similar problem was presented to this court.

(1965),
In New

Hampshire, supra, the fire insurer of the lessor brought
an action for indemnity seeking to recover the amount it
paid under a fire insurance policy.

No return or offset

of a premium was given to the lessee by New Hampshire.
This Court held that New Hampshire was not entitled to
recover from the lessee, stating that the lessee promised only to pay any loss to the lessor and that as
the lessor lost nothing after insuring himself, the
assignee of the lessor New Hampshire could not recover.
In State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Holt, 28
Utah 2d 426, 503 P.2d 1205, this Court held where an
uninsured motorist had never been sued and no judgment
had been rendered against the uninsured motorist for
damages, there was no legal obligation on the part of
the uninsured to pay any money and that the trial court
was without authority to enter judgment against an uninsured motorist's insurance company.
The assignment of interest clause in United
Pacific's policy provides that no assignment of interest
under its policy shall bind the company until its consent
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is endorsed on the policy.

United Pacific was not

requested to add Heublein as an lnsure
·
d until January
17, 1971.
Section 31-19-18, Utah Code Annotated 1953
As Amended, provides:
Contract of insurance--Variations of
terms of policy invalid.--No insurer
or its agent, nor any solicitor or
broker shall make any contract of insurance or agreement as to such contract,
other than is plainly expressed in the
policy issued thereon.
Any such understanding or agreement not so expressed
shall be invalid.
There is not one word in the United Pacific
policy that expresses any intent whatsoever to insure
Heublein prior to January 17, 1971.
The general rule is that a liability policy is
a personal contract and cannot be assigned.

This is

true where assignment is expressly prohibited by the
terms of the policy unless the insurer consents.
Rendelman v. Levitt, 24 S.lv.2d 211, Mo. App. 1930;
Ocean Accident & Guaranty Company v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company, 100 F.2d 441, 8th Cir. 1939.

This

rule is based on the right of the insurer to chose its
insured so as to know what risk it is undertaking.

This

rule is based on the reasoning that the liability of one
person for the same injury may be substantially greater
in dollars than the liability of another.
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Everyone knows that the liability of a national
company will lead to a substantially greater amount
being awarded in damages than the liability of a local
company or individual.
While it is true that insureds can assign rights
to recover losses under property coverages, it is not
true that an individual or company can buy a liability
policy in its name and then require the insurance company to defend some other company or individual.
CONCLUSION
.The judgment of the lower court should be
reversed and summary judgment granted in favor of
United Pacific and against Aetna because:
1.

United Pacific did not insure Heublein on

December 31, 1970, the date Shuput was injured.
2.

United Pacific's obligation was to defend

Regina, which could have been sued and was not.
3.

The allegations in the Complaint in the

case instituted by Shuput against Heublein in United
States District Court for the District of Utah show
no duty on the part of United Pacific to defend Heublein
or to settle claims against Heublein.
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4.

As the primary coverage of ~etna was not

exhausted, no coverage is afforded under the United
Pacific policy, even if it be construed that both
United Pacific and Aetna are insurers of Heublein.
5.

As Heublein incurred no loss and paid no

expenses arising from the Shuput action, Heublein has
lost nothing, and its assignee Aetna has no hook upon
which liability can attach.
6.

The no-assignment-of-interest clause bars

recovery rights of Heublein and ~
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